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THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
Todd]. Zywicki*
DEBT'S DOMINION:

By David A.
xi, 281. $35.

A

Skeet, Jr.

HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA.

Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2001. Pp.

As this Review was being written, Congress· once again failed to
pass the bipartisan bankruptcy-reform bill, although many expect it to
be enacted at some point in the near future. At the same time,
WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing, and their ignominious peers con
tinue to set records for the size, expense, and public attention drawn
to business bankruptcy. For the first time, consumer bankruptcies
surpassed the 1.5 million per year mark, continuing an irresistible
upward trend. Meanwhile, law firms announce layoffs and salary
freezes in most departments, and bankruptcy professionals prosper
amidst the despair, billing $1 million per day on the Enron case alone
- even as creditors and shareholders sit by awaiting payment. Clearly
we are witnessing a profound and unprecedented change in the politi
cal, social, and economic framework of bankruptcy.
How did we get here and where are we headed? These are the
questions brilliantly addressed by David A. Skeel, Jr.,1 in Debt's
Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America. Told with a
sound understanding of theory and law, and an eye for detail, Skeel's
book is an instant classic - a comprehensive and intriguing history of
bankruptcy law in America. But to characterize the book as "history"
is to slight its reach and importance. In a concise and readable 250
pages, Skeel brings to life not only the political and economic history
of bankruptcy law, but also the fascinating history of the bankruptcy
bar itself. Finally, Skeel deftly leads the reader through the fundamen
tal theoretical debates that have shaped bankruptcy law during the
past century, including the contentious intellectual debates between
"Progressive" academic theorists and their rivals from the "Law and
Economics School." Skeel has written a book that will serve as both
*
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M.A. (Economics) 1990, Clemson; J.D. 1993, University of Virginia. - Ed. I would like to
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support. I would also like to thank the International Centre for Economic Research (ICER)
Turin, I taly, where much of this essay was written as a Fellow during Summer 2002.
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the definitive work on the history of bankruptcy law for bankruptcy
experts as well as a comprehensive guide on the development of the
modern American bankruptcy system for the interested generalist in
law or business.
This Review considers the past, present, and future of bankruptcy
law through the lens of Skeel's analysis. Part I provides an overview of
Skeel's historical thesis, including the novel theoretical methods he
uses to advance his analysis. Part II examines the current state of
bankruptcy law, focusing particularly on the political and economic
battles involving bankruptcy reform during the past several years. Part
III considers Skeel's predictions as to the future evolution of bank
ruptcy law and practice in America and abroad.
I.

THE PAST: THE HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA

Skeel divides the history of bankruptcy law in America into three
historical stages: the nineteenth century, the era of the 1898 Bank
ruptcy Act and the Great Depression, and the modern era of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code. As Skeel notes, the shape of bankruptcy law and
practice throughout American. history is at least as much a result of
political considerations and influence as economic considerations. To
develop his point, Skeel draws on the fields of public choice and social
choice, both of which apply the assumptions and tools of economics to
the study of politics. Skeel uses these tools to shape his narrative,
giving his argument an analytical edge that prior historical studies of
American bankruptcy law lacked.2 In particular, American bankruptcy
law can be understood as resulting from the clash of three sets of
interests: prodebtor ideological interests (often spearheaded by law
professors), creditor interests, and bankruptcy professionals; interests
(including bankruptcy judges). Although the outcome of this three
way political wrestling match is unclear at any given moment, the
dominant course of evolution of American bankruptcy law has been
towards increasingly generous bankruptcy laws that provide strong
incentives for both individual and corporate debtors to file bank
ruptcy.
A.

Bankruptcy Legislation in the Nin.eteenth Century

The first era of American bankruptcy legislation was rooted in the
Constitution's enumeration of Congress's power to "establish uniform
laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."3
Like the other economic provisions of the Constitution, the primary
2. The classic study is CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
(1935).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I , § 8, cl. 4.
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purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause was to rein in the prodebtor
excesses of state legislatures under the Articles of Confederation.4
Under the Articles of Confederation, creditors confronted numerous
obstacles to their attempts to collect judgments, including judgment
jumping from one state to another and efforts by some states to
discharge obligations owed by debtors, primarily at the expense of
out-of-state creditors.5 According to James Madison, regulation of
bankruptcy was "intimately connected with the regulation of com
merce, and [would] prevent so many frauds where the parties or their
property may lie or be removed into different states that the expedi
ency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question."6 Subject to
these powers designed to augment the ability of creditors to recover
judgments, most debtor-creditor relations remained governed by state
law, an allocation of power that continues today.
During the nineteenth century, the federal government enacted
three bankruptcy laws prior to the 1898 Act: the Bankruptcy Acts of
1800, 1841, and 1867 (p. 25). Each act was spawned amidst a financial
crisis and was repealed soon thereafter. The 1800 Act lasted only three
years, the 1841 Act lasted only two years, and the 1867 Act was
repealed eleven years later. All together, therefore, these three acts
lasted a total of sixteen years. In the intervening periods, debtor
creditor relations remained wholly the province of state law. Skeel
demonstrates that this federal instability resulted from "legislative
cycling," a phenomenon identified by economists and political scien
tists that can arise where lawmakers hold three or more positions
which cannot be aligned on a simple linear spectrum of choices (p. 28).
Skeel identifies three different positions with respect to bankruptcy,
each identified with a particular region of the country, and each with
approximately equal political support. As a result of these tensions,
bankruptcy legislation was enacted only in periods of crisis, receding
soon afterwards. Even then, it was often necessary to engage in politi
cal logrolling in order to fashion a majority. Given the regional nature
of the American economy for most of the nineteenth century,
however, there was little need for national bankruptcy legislation in
most circumstances, leaving debtor-creditor relations largely in the
hands of state governments.

4. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Bankruptcy Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2003).
5. Thus, although conventional wisdom has it that the Bankruptcy Clause of the Consti
tution was a protection for debtors, it was primarily the reverse. Indeed, many states main
tained imprisonment for debt well into the nineteenth century. Id.

6. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
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The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Great Depression

The decades following the Civil War saw an increasing nationaliza
tion of the American economy, spurred by advances in communica
tions and transportation technology, such as railroads, electricity, the
air brake, the elevator, and the steam boiler.7 Millions of Americans
left rural farms for urban factories, accompanied by millions more new
immigrants.8 The number of factories nearly quadrupled from 140,000
in 1865 to 5 12,000 in 1900, and the size of factories grew even more
rapidly.9 Between 1870 and 1900 the nationwide rail network grew
from 53,000 to 193,000 miles.10 Accompanying the rise of the national
economy, a host of new special-interest groups arose to represent an
interstate constituency.11
Skeel focuses on the large number of commercial organizations
founded during this period, arguing that they provided the impetus
that eventually led to the 1898 Bankruptcy Act (p. 35). In particular,
the overlay of an emerging national economy onto a state-based sys
tem of debt collection created numerous problems. "Merchants who
engaged in interstate commerce complained bitterly and repeatedly
that debtors played favorites when they ran into financial trouble," he
writes, adding that, "[t]he favorites were family members and local
creditors, not the out-of-state merchants" (p. 36).
The primary impetus for the 1898 Act, therefore, was the efforts of
creditors to develop more streamlined procedures for debt collection,
especially on interstate debts. But Skeel notes two anomalies of the
1898 Act as finally enacted: first, the primary beneficiaries of the Act
were bankruptcy lawyers rather than creditors, and second, the 1898
Act turned out to be much more debtor-friendly than originally
anticipated (p. 43). As Skeel observes of the finished product, "[t]hese
characteristics - the generally debtor-friendly approach to bank
ruptcy, and the primacy of lawyers rather than an administrator distinguish U.S. bankruptcy law from every other insolvency law in the
world" (p. 43).
The lawyer-friendly and debtor-friendly characteristics of the
1898 Act have distinguished American bankruptcy law ever since.
Moreover, they served to end the century of legislative cycling that
7. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 368 (2000).
8. Id. at 370-71.
9. Id. at 368-69.
10. Id. at 369.
11. See Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Sev
enteenth Amendment and its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 165, 179 (1997); Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice
Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007 (1994).
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had undone previous bankruptcy laws. The debtor-friendly nature
created by the 1898 Act reflected the rise of an American populist
ideology that continues to permeate the bankruptcy debates today.
Although lawyers did not provide the impetus for the 1898 Act, they
"came out of the woodwork to fill the need" created by the new law
(p. 43). This created an entrenched and well-organized constituency
who would benefit from the perpetuation of the law and therefore
could be counted on to oppose any future repeal or major innovations,
thereby ending legislative cycling in Congress.12
The 1898 Act remained in place until supplanted by the 1978 Code.
During this period, however, bankruptcy law and practice were
certainly not static. The invention of equity receiverships as a judicial
procedure to reorganize the railroads at the turn of the century, the
intervention of the Great Depression, and William 0. Douglas's high
profile hearings while Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") are also among the pivotal incidents recounted
by Skeel. From this economic and political process emerged the
Chandler Act amendments to the Act, which increased governmental
oversight of the bankruptcy process. Although space limits the ability
to discuss these developments in detail here, these developments
resulted in prestigious Wall Street law firms abandoning their bank
ruptcy practices. At the same time, ordinary bankruptcy lawyers
remained unscathed, and in many ways richer and more influential
than ever before.
C.

The 1978 B ankruptcy Code

By the 1970s, the creaky construct of the 1898 Act was ripe for
overhaul. Again the impetus came from creditors who were frustrated
with the rising number of personal bankruptcy filings during the 1950s
and 1960s. Individual filings rose from 25,040 in 1950 to 178,202 in
1970 (p. 137). Although trivial by modern standards, at the time this
rise sparked concern. Nonetheless, creditors once again lost control of
the process they initiated, as the bar again seized the reins of the
reform effort. By the time the process was over, both personal and
business bankruptcy laws were made more lax rather than strict. Skeel
documents a series of bankruptcy "scope expanding" reforms that
resulted in increased bankruptcy filings (both personal and business),
as well as a more expansive role generally for bankruptcy law in the
American economy and society (pp. 147-51). In addition, the 1978
Code brought Wall Street lawyers and banks back into bankruptcy
practice by increasing fees, increasing prestige, and further weakening
public oversight of the process by elimination of the SEC's oversight
12. See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEG. STUD. 259, 26872 (1999).
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role. The end result was to reinvigorate professional control of bank
ruptcy proceedings and professional influence in Congress. As Skeel
notes, ideology was muted throughout the process that culminated in
the 1978 Code, leading to a belief that bankruptcy was primarily a
"technical" process best left to the "experts" - namely, bankruptcy
professionals (p. 141). Wrapped in the veneer of expertise, bankruptcy
professionals further entrenched their influence over bankruptcy
proceedings and legislation, fending off efforts to retrench the scope
or expense of either personal or business bankruptcy. As Bruce
Carruthers and Terence Halliday observe in their study of the 1978
Code, following its enactment "bankruptcy professionals experienced
a meteoric rise in their professional identity, their market position,
and the rewards accompanying both."13 Similarly, Congressman
Robert Drinan observed during the debates over the 1978 Code that it
amounted to a " 'full employment bill' for lawyers."14
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code profoundly changed the bankruptcy
system and its importance in society and the economy. By making
bankruptcy more attractive to individuals, personal bankruptcies rose
from less than 300,000 in 1980 to over 1.5 million in 2002.15 By making
bankruptcy more attractive for corporations as well, it routinized
corporate bankruptcy, turning it into a business and strategic decision
rather than a last resort. The wealth and prominence of bankruptcy
professionals rose as well, as they escaped the unsavory ghetto in
which they toiled for decades after the New Deal reforms. Today, the
largest and most prestigious law firms, investment banks, accounting
firms, and consultants in America have thriving bankruptcy practices,
representing all interests in the bankruptcy system, including debtors.
And although piecemeal reforms enacted in 1984 reined in some of
the excesses of the 1978 Code, they did little to stem the rising tide of
consumer-bankruptcy filings or to reduce the expense and delay asso
ciated with the chapter 11 process.
D.

The Lessons of History

The 1898 Act thus set in place the three political interests that have
shaped American bankruptcy law from 1898, through the 1978 Code,
to the present: (1) creditor interests, (2) prodebtor interests (usually
ideological, rather than particular), and (3) the interests of bankruptcy

13. BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE
MAKING OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 421
(1998).
14. Id. at 302 (quoting Congressman Robert Drinan (internal quotation marks omit
ted)).
15. ABI World, U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2002, at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/
1980annual.html (last visited May 13, 2003).
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professionals. As Skeel notes, however, "of all these groups, bank
ruptcy professionals are the ones who have most strongly influenced
the shape of U.S. bankruptcy law in the century since its enactment in
1898" (p. 81). This is because, compared to other interest groups,
bankruptcy lawyers are relatively better positioned than other interest
groups to influence the legislative process. It is important to keep in
mind that interest-group influence is a matter of relative influence, not
absolute influence.16 Thus, in general, even if interest-group A is less
organized than interest-group B, A will still be favored in the political
process relative to even more dispersed and unorganized groups,
except for the rare situation where A's and B's positions are squarely
opposed. In general, however, gains to trade are available among
interest groups such that comparatively well-organized interest groups
can form alliances to provide shared benefits to themselves and to
impose the costs on the unorganized public. 17 Following Mancur
Olson, Skeel observes that an interest group's influence is primarily a
function of how homogeneous, coherent, politically-savvy, and well
organized the group is.
Public choice analysis illuminates why bankruptcy lawyers have
proven such a potent lobbying force. Bankruptcy lawyers have clear
goals - to increase the number of bankruptcies filed and the expense
of each. Regardless whether a particular lawyer represents debtors,
creditors, or both, the fact remains that bankruptcy lawyers can make
money only if individuals and corporations file bankruptcy. Thus,
bankruptcy lawyers generally will seek to increase both the number of
bankruptcy cases filed and the expense of bankruptcy proceedings.
This also means that even though debtors and potential debtors are
not directly represented in the bankruptcy process, their interests are
usually well-represented by bankruptcy attorneys who will lobby for
open access to bankruptcy for debtors. Moreover, the highly technical
and complex nature of bankruptcy law and practice increases the
leverage of lawyers in the legislative process both by making their
expertise an essential part of the legislative process and making it
more difficult for the public and lawmakers to monitor their special
interest influence on particular provisions that may seem unimportant
but can have a vast impact on a lawyer's wealth (p. 87). This technical
expertise further heightens the influence of lawyers when lawmakers
move from issues of broad principle to technical legislative drafting (p.
46).
Although creditors have clear interest in the content of bankruptcy
laws, they suffer several problems in exercising political influence
16. See Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Po
litical Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 874-87
(1999).
17. See id.
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when compared to bankruptcy professionals.18 First, many creditors,
such as trade creditors, are simply too hard to organize into an effec
tive lobbying group because of their large numbers and the small stake
each has in changing the law. Second, unlike bankruptcy lawyers, the
interests of creditors are not homogeneous, creating collective-action
problems. Because a debtor by definition is unable to pay his debts,
secured creditors and unsecured creditors usually are locked in a zero
sum game regarding distribution of the debtor's estate. A bigger slice
for secured creditors means less for unsecured creditors, and vice
versa. Third, to the extent that unsecured credit becomes more risky
because of easy access to bankruptcy, unsecured credit raises the cost
of unsecured credit and creates a market substitution toward greater
use of secured credit.19 Thus, secured creditors will have little concern
about the overall number of bankruptcy filings or the amounts distrib
uted, although they will care about specific issues that affect them,
such as cramdown and valuation issues.20
The incentive for creditors to lobby for changes in the bankruptcy
system will also be mitigated by the fact that any gains will be tempo
rary. Tightening bankruptcy laws to reduce risk retroactively creates a
one-time opportunity to earn economic profits, but competition and
entry into the market will dissipate those profits, returning all lenders
to a competitive equilibrium. Creditors are able to pass along some of
their losses to borrowers who repay their debts - "repayers" - in the
form of higher downpayments, higher interest rates, and reduced
benefits (p. 82). Because this mitigates some of the creditors' losses,
this further reduces creditors' incentives to lobby for tighter bank
ruptcy laws. Repayers face even more daunting obstacles to making
their voices heard - given the small cost borne by each repayer as a
result of excessive bankruptcies, each has minimal incentive to try to
influence the legislative process. Moreover, repayers have no effective
proxy representative for their interests, unlike bankruptcy filers who
can count on bankruptcy lawyers to aggressively advance their inter
ests in the political process.
The final influence on the bankruptcy process is the tradition of
prodebtor, populist, and progressive ideology in American politics.
These bankruptcy "progressives" view bankruptcy as an economic and
social safety valve to redistribute wealth to the poor and to preserve
18. See Todd J. Zywicki, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law
in England and the United States, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 361, 387-88 (2000) (hereinafter Zy
wicki, Rescuing Business] (book review).
19. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 125-26
(2000).
20. Cramdown and valuation issues are of particular interest to creditors because they
affect the valuation of the creditor's collateral and thus how much can be recovered in bank
ruptcy. See Todd J. Zywicki, Cramdown and the Code: Calculating Cramdown Interest Rates
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 251 (1994).
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struggling businesses. Skeel also notes the major involvement of bank
ruptcy law professors in the legislative process, such as Harvard's Vern
Countryman,21 usually articulating a prodebtor ideological perspective
(p. 194). Finally, so-called "consumer advocates" such as Ralph Nader
have also tended to favor expansion of access to the bankruptcy
system on populist principle, even though easy bankruptcy access only
benefits the small class of bankrupt consumers, not the larger class of
consumers who repay their debts and thereby subsidize those who file
bankruptcy. As Skeel notes, this progressive ideology has greatly
influenced the shape of American bankruptcy legislation (p. 16).
Thus, the history of American bankruptcy legislation is not
surprising. Reform efforts are initiated in the rare instances when
creditors are able to overcome their collective-action problems and
progressive ideological opposition to push for reforms. Once the proc
ess commences, however, both the process and the technical drafting
of legislation are soon captured by lawyers. In the end, lawyers usually
manage to sidetrack the reforms that were originally sought and
instead end up turning the legislation to their own advantage.
II. THE PRESENT:

THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 2002

Skeel's analysis helps to unravel the politics surrounding the bank
ruptcy-reform efforts of recent years, including the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 2002 ("BRA"), which just failed in the last Congress.
The reform efforts were initiated in 1994, when Congress authorized a
new commission, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
("NBRC"), to conduct a study of bankruptcy law and to recommend
changes (p. 187). Modeled after the 1973 Commission, the NBRC was
charged with reviewing the Code and recommending changes and
updates. The bankruptcy world had certainly changed dramatically in
the intervening years between the passage of the 1978 Code and the
formation of the NBRC in 1994. In 1978, there were 172,423 nonbusi
ness bankruptcy filings (p. 188) . By 1994, the consumer-bankruptcy
filing rate had quadrupled to almost 800,000 annually, and has almost
doubled again since then (p. 188). Moreover, the rise of leveraged buy
outs, junk bonds, and mass-tort litigation had all changed business
bankruptcy substantially.
Unlike the 1973 Commission, however, the NBRC's deliberations
and conclusions were highly divisive and controversial, especially
regarding consumer-bankruptcy issues. As Skeel writes, "In its
consumer recommendations, the 1994 commission's report took a
21. Countryman began his career in the 1950s as a defender of alleged communist sym
pathizers and became an outspoken and politically active prodebtor lobbyist through the
1960s and 1970s, playing a pivotal role in shaping the debtor-friendly provisions of the 1978
Code. P. 194.

May 2003]

Bankruptcy Law

2025

prodebtor cast, firmly rejecting calls to tighten the bankruptcy laws
and vigorously defending consumer debtors' right to an immediate
discharge. Consumer creditors were less than enthusiastic with the
process" (p. 187). NBRC reporter and Harvard Law School professor
Elizabeth Warren, the acknowledged leader of the modern bank
ruptcy progressives, excluded contrary views and orchestrated a set of
recommendations that advanced the unique perspectives of its leaders
(p. 201).
Despite the "blue ribbon" composition of the NBRC, its idiosyn
cratic ideological orientation guaranteed that its recommendations
would be dead on arrival when presented to Congress in 1996. Unsur
prisingly, when Congress actually turned to the task of reforming the
bankruptcy laws, it moved in the direction of trying to tighten the
laws, rather than loosening them.
Launched with fanfare, the NBRC had at its disposal ample finan
cial, intellectual, and political resources. Nonetheless, the NBRC
process quickly ran off the rails of moderation and compromise,
producing a one-sided and politically stillborn product. Instead of
following the Commission's prodebtor recommendations, Congress
immediately proposed a bankruptcy-reform bill that tightened the
bankruptcy laws by weeding out fraud and abuse in consumer cases
and enacting reforms designed to reduce the cost and delay of small
business bankruptcies. Skeel asks, "How did so much dysfunction
come from a commission who innocuous-sounding charge was to look
for ways to perfect a generally adequate framework?" (p. 198). In
addition, why were the political dynamics in this situation so strongly
oriented toward reform that bankruptcy-reform efforts appear to be
able to overcome the traditional obstacles that had prevented
comprehensive reform in the past?
In part, both the NBRC's ·dysfunction and the BRA's proposed
reforms occurred because of the different ideological orientations of
the NBRC and Congress during the 1990s. In contrast to the leftward
tilt of the NBRC and its leaders, the Republican takeover of Congress
in 1994 made the Washington political environment turn much more
ideologically conservative, leading to a political and intellectual envi
ronment that was decidedly unfriendly to the NBRC's prodebtor
recommendations (p. 199). Skeel attributes this distinction to the
academic debate between "progressive"· scholars on one hand and
"law and economics" scholars on the other. Although there is much
truth to this analysis, I believe it is incomplete. Based on my personal
experience as an advisor to Congress for the past several years on
bankruptcy reform, I believe that Congress is animated by a new
political ideology of "personal responsibility" that serves as a coun-
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terweight to the traditional prodebtor ideology.22 Although it overlaps
in many ways with law and economics ideas, there is much in the
personal responsibility ideology that is not captured by the "law and
economics" label, which connotes an overriding concern with eco
nomic efficiency. The personal responsibility ideology sees consumer
bankruptcy as primarily a moral issue, rather than an economic issue.
To be sure, personal-responsibility and law-and-economics arguments
often reinforce one another, as much of the personal-responsibility
rhetoric stresses the injustice of forcing responsible consumers to sub
sidize the recklessness of profligate borrowers. But the distinction is
deeper than just economics: soaring consumer-bankruptcy filing rates
viewed as a crisis of the American soul, rather than a mere matter of
economic policy. Put simply, there is no economic explanation for the
upsurge in individual bankruptcy filings in the late 1990s, an era of
unprecedented prosperity, low interest rates, low unemployment rates,
and soaring levels of individual wealth. Given the anomaly of eco
nomic prosperity combined with the staggering rise in bankruptcy
filings, many have concluded that the problem is social and spiritual,
rather than economic.23
This focus on an ideology of personal responsibility is evident in
the debates surrounding bankruptcy reform. Consider the comments
of House Majority Leader Richard Armey:
Bankruptcy laws in America have put a lie to one of the most important
lessons we teach our children. Bankruptcy laws in America have said to
our children, you are a fool if you do not file. That is not right. ... It is
not about the money. Anybody who thinks this bill is about who gets the
money is missing the point....This bill is about the character of a Nation
and will the Nation's laws have a character of the Nation's people.24

House Judiciary Chairman James Sensenbrenner similarly remarks,
"The purpose of the bill is to improve bankruptcy law and practice by
restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy
system, and to ensure that the system is fair to both debtors and
creditors."25 When the BRA was reported out of the Conference
Committee in July 2002, Senator Orrin Hatch compared it to recent
corporate responsibility initiatives, stating, ''In these hard economic
times, while we're dealing with corporate responsibility, we should

22. This political emphasis on personal responsibility is evident in many other areas as
well, including most notably, welfare reform. See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social
Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 393, 430 (2001) [hereinafter Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as
Social Legislation].
23. See id. at 428-29.
24. 147 CONG. REC. H518 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2001) (statement of Rep. Armey).
25. 147 CONG. REC. H517 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2001) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
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also address personal responsibility."26 Many liberal leaders have
embraced the moral argument in favor of bankruptcy reform, such as
Democratic Congressman Barney Frank, who says, "I think people
should have to pay their bills. . . . I am for toughening bankruptcy
laws. It's only a minority who ever go bankrupt, and those costs
get passed on to the majority who pay their bills."27 Although
economic analysis is entwined in the values argument, much of
Congress's interest in consumer-bankruptcy reform is rooted in
values-based concerns over personal and financial responsibility.28
Personal bankruptcy is part of a larger set of concerns over the moral
character of the nation, its leaders, and the negative impact of rampant
breaking of one's financial promises on reliability, trust, and reciproc
ity in other aspects of life.29
Nesting bankruptcy into a larger social and ideological framework
regarding personal responsibility and morality has altered the political
balance regarding bankruptcy. According to Douglass North, the
power of ideology in political decisionmaking is that it helps to over
come collective-action and free-rider problems and thus to motivate
action in the face of concentrated interest-group pressures.30 Nonpro
gressives have traditionally viewed bankruptcy in technical rather than
ideological terms, leaving no articulate philosophical counterweight to
the progressives. The development of a personal-responsibility ideol
ogy in Congress has offset the progressives' traditional advantage,
creating a shift in the baseline presumptions for Congress as to the
appropriate direction for reforms. Ideological voting by politicians
also tends to be most pronounced on issues of low public salience, of
which bankruptcy appears to be such an issue.31 The conservative
takeover of Congress in 1994, therefore, effected an ideological shift in
Congress that created a momentum for stricter bankruptcy laws
anchored in notions of personal responsibility, rather than for the pro
debtor reforms favored by the NBRC. This counteroffensive must
have surprised the NBRC leaders - whereas previous progressive
initiatives had met with minimal ideological opposition, this time the

26. Editorial, Bankruptcy Reform Nears: People Who Can Repay Debts Should Be Re
quired to Do So, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 26, 2002, at 128 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
27. Anne E. Kornblut, Credit Card Issuers Seek to Curb Debtors' Bankruptcy Relief,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 1999, at Al.
28. See Todd J. Zywicki, With Apologies to Screwtape: A Response to Professor Alexan
der, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 613 (2000) [hereinafter Zywicki, With Apologies to Screwtape].
29. See Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, supra note 22, at 412-13.
30. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 51-58
(1981).
31. See Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory
of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984).
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NBRC's recommendations met with fierce ideological opposition from
Congress.
The Republican takeover of Congress also dramatically affected
the interest-group balance in Congress, weakening the traditional
hammerlock exercised by bankruptcy lawyers. When the NBRC was
constituted, it was generally believed that its influence would be simi
lar to that of the lawyer-dominated National Bankruptcy Review
Commission of the 1970s, which had exercised comprehensive control
over the drafting of the 1978 Code. The Commission of the 1970s
effectively served as a "private legislature," exercising agenda control
throughout the entire legislative process that culminated in the 1978
Code. It was generally believed that the NBRC of the 1990s would
have a similar influence. As commentators have observed, these
"private legislatures" exhibit many of the same interest-group and
public-choice influences as traditional legislatures.32 In fact, because of
the undemocratic composition of these groups, their narrow scope,
and their low public profile, these private law-reform groups often
exhibit even deeper pathologies than public legislatures.33 As noted
above, lawyers and progressive ideologues share a common interest in
the expansion of the role of bankruptcy. Given the prodebtor ideo
logical orientation of the NBRC and the strong agenda control exer
cised by its leaders, the interests and influence of bankruptcy lawyers
was highly magnified, much more so than in a public legislature.
Given the obvious stake of lawyers in the reform process, the
receptive attitude of the NBRC's leaders to the influence of lawyers is
striking. Professor Warren, the NBRC reporter, has criticized the
attempts of creditors to influence the NBRC's hearings, longing
instead for the days when creditors and other interested parties left
bankruptcy law up to the experts "who spent their professional lives in
the field, advising Congress either through the National Bankruptcy
Conference or later as part of the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges. Those days have passed. "34 Elsewhere she observes of the
NBRC:
The interests of the lobbyists and their collateral acquaintances came as a
surprise, but it should not have. Long past were the days when Frank
Kennedy could meet with Larry King, Joe Lee, Conrad Cyr, Vern Coun
tryman, Gerry Smith and a handful of other people to work out the basic

32. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 607-08 (1995). To be sure, there are some differences as well as

similarities between the NBRC and other private legislatures. Unfortunately, space con
straints prevent a more detailed comparison.
33. Id.

Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in
Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5.
34.
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structure of the 1973 Commission recommendations on consumer bank
ruptcy.35

Whereas creditors and other interested parties were dismissed as
special-interest pleaders, bankruptcy lawyers and judges were viewed
as disinterested experts, notwithstanding the vital financial stake that
they had in the outcome of the NBRC process. This dichotomy is
absurd, but to the extent that key NBRC decisionmakers actually
embraced a "white hat" versus "black hat" characterization of rival
interest groups, it may account for some of the dovetailing of lawyer
and ideological interests in the NBRC process. In turn, various organi
zations· of bankruptcy professionals provided major financial support
to progressive scholars whose research coincidentally tends to support
the positions advocated by the bankruptcy bar.36
In the end, the NBRC recommendations comprised a veritable
"wish list" of the positions favored by the bankruptcy bar. Although
the NBRC's recommendations covered a vast scope, they almost
uniformly increased the power, prestige, and wealth of bankruptcy
lawyers and judges. For example, the recommendations included such
items as prohibitions against prebankruptcy waivers of bankruptcy
rights in chapter 11 cases (such as waiver of the right to file bank
ruptcy or waiver of the automatic stay), Article III status for bank
ruptcy judges, recommendations for greater use of bankruptcy to
resolve mass tort issues, and numerous recommendations in the
consumer area that increased the incentives to file bankruptcy.37
Bankruptcy professionals also lobbied intently against the BRA in
Congress, and while successful at delaying reform, they were unable to
defeat it. In the end, opponents of reform have so far been able to
count on only 20-25% of Congress to oppose reform. Moreover, even
this meager figure includes the votes of those who voted against the
BRA not based on ideology or interest-group solidarity regarding its
35. Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 483, 488 (1977).
36. See The Endowment for Education of the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges, at http://www.ncbj.org/endowrpt02.htm (last visited May 19, 2003) (listing recipients
of grants from the NCBJ Endowment for Education). A highly-publicized study critical of
the impact of means-testing was funded by the American Bankruptcy Institute, another or
ganization of bankruptcy professionals. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White,
Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7
Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27 (1999). The conclusions of that study rest on an
erroneous understanding of how the budget allowances for means-testing would be calcu
lated. See Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 177, 187-88.
37. For instance, bankruptcy lawyers attempted to force through a recommendation to
weaken the disinterestedness requirement, but the initial vote on the effort to do so was later
reconsidered after it drew substantial opposition from other members of the Commission.
The incident is described in Todd J. Zywicki, Mend It, Don't End It: The Case for Retaining
the Disinterestedness Requirement for Debtor in Possession's Professionals, 18 MISS. C. L.
REV. 291 (1998).
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core provisions, but because of opposition on tangential issues such as
proposed limits on the homestead exemption or the "Schumer
Amendment" relating to nondischargeability of civil judgments
imposed on abortion-clinic protesters. Many of these members, espe
cially conservatives from Texas and Florida, clearly supported the core
provisions of the BRA. In the end, therefore, the only substantive
opposition to bankruptcy reform came from the extreme prodebtor
fringe of the ideological spectrum and politicians who were especially
beholden to financial contributions by lawyers.38 Despite these intense
lobbying efforts, bankruptcy professionals have been unable to repli
cate their previous successes in turning the reform process to their
advantage. Although a final reckoning of the reasons why will require
further study in the future, my personal experience suggests two
reasons why this was the case.
First, the Republican takeover of Congress not only changed the
ideological orientation of Congress, it also dramatically changed the
political balance. Lawyers are simply less influential and less friendly
with Republicans than with Democrats, especially in the Judiciary
Committees, which traditionally have been the private playground for
lawyers. The overwhelming majority of lawyers' political contributions
flow to Democratic politicians.39 Moreover, on many important issues
including tort reform, the Republican legislative agenda is fiercely
opposed by a core Democratic constituency of lawyers. Given this
history, special-interest pleading by lawyers generally is less well
received by Republican congresses than by their Democratic prede
cessors.
Second, early on in the legislative process bankruptcy lawyers
undermined their own credibility through a strategy of confrontation
and confusion, rather than constructive participation in the reform
process. Instead of offering constructive influence on the process,
bankruptcy professionals instead launched a full-frontal assault against
the B RA and its alleged political motivations. The purpose of
the strategy apparently was to delay the BRA in the hopes of a
Democratic takeover of Congress in the 1998 election cycle, which did
not occur. Nonetheless, their aggressive rhetoric did stall reform,
thereby emboldening the strategy. From that point on, bankruptcy
professionals committed themselves to a slash-and-burn rhetorical and
38. Congressman Jerrold Nadler spearheaded opposition to the BRA in the House;
Senators Paul Wellstone and Edward Kennedy did so in the Senate. Each of the three have
'
received thousands of dollars of campaign contributions from lawyers, and lawyers are
among the top two or three contributors to their campaigns. Senator Kennedy alone re
ceived over one million dollars from lawyers and lobbyists in his last Senate election. See
http://www.opensecrets.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2003); see also Zywicki, With Apologies to
Screwtape, supra note 28, at 626 n.68 (elaborating on financial contributions in the context of
bankruptcy reform).
39. See Zywicki, With Apologies tu Screwtape, supra note 28, at 626 n.68.
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political strategy that quickly eroded their support on Capitol Hill.
False charges about the purported negative effect of the BRA on
women, children, poor, and infirm successfully spawned confusion and
delayed reform in the short run, but in the long run the strategy has
proven self-defeating. It soon became difficult to distinguish the bar's
legitimate criticisms from posturing and obstructionism, and blatant
factual errors coupled with a hard-edged rhetorical strategy eventually
undermined the trustworthiness of bankruptcy professionals. In
the end, this squandered the one traditional source of professional
influence - their purported provision of nonpartisan technical advice
to Congress.
Which raises the third group of interests in Skeel's trinity - credi
tors. Much has been said and written about the influence of creditors
in lobbying for the BRA, and while most of it is overblown, there is a
kernel of truth in the fact that for the first time in recent memory
creditors as a group have been able to overcome their collective-action
problems to lobby effectively for their interests. In part, this greater
political organization reflects the greater incentives of creditors to do
something in the face of millions of bankruptcy filings and the billions
of dollars in discharged debts caused by them. As the benefits of
action (or the costs to be averted) rise, parties will be willing to invest
greater amounts to organize to capture those benefits.40 But more
fundamentally, the greater ability of creditors to organize regarding
the BRA reflects the fact that unlike previous reform efforts, the
benefits-of the BRA are spread across many different classes of credi
tors, thereby overcoming the intramural struggles that have crippled
creditor efforts in the past. Unsecured creditors obtained such long
sought provisions such as means-testing eligibility of debtors for chap
ter 7 relief by creating a presumption for high-income debtors with
substantial repayment capacity to file in chapter 13 instead of chapter
7 unless they can demonstrate significant hardship.41 There are several
new protections for secured creditors as well, such as rules limiting the
cramdown of automobile loans and increased powers of mortgage
creditors to respond to repeated bad-faith filings by debtors simply to
stave off foreclosure. Even tax creditors were given new mechanisms
for protecting their rights. Finally, marital-support creditors received
several new protections that reduce the interference of bankruptcy
with collection of alimony and child support obligations, as well as
eliminating the incentives of debtors to file bankruptcy strategically to
discharge certain marital obligations. Moreover, all creditors will
benefit from reforms that increase debtor accountability by making
40. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J. 224 (1967).
41. The rationale and mechanism of means-testing is described in detail in Jones
Zywicki, supra note 36, at 181-207.
·
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debtors' repayment schedules more honest and limiting the ability of
debtors to hide assets and understate income. As the fabric of the 1978
Code has become increasingly tattered and debtors have become
increasingly savvy about exploiting the loopholes in the Code, it has
become possible for creditors to find common ground to lobby for
reforms that benefit all classes of creditors. Political action by credi
tors historically has been frustrated by the zero-sum nature of bank
ruptcy - more money for secured creditors means less for unsecured
creditors and vice-versa. Today, however, bankruptcy losses to all
creditors are sufficiently large and widespread that all creditors have
something to gain from reducing bankruptcy fraud and abuse, and as a
result a coherent and stable coalition of creditors has been able to
hold together for several years.
While creditors were actively involved in the legislative process
of the BRA, it is easy to overstate their influence. In a recent study,
Stephen Nunez and Howard Rosenthal conclude that perhaps 15 of
the 306 members' votes in the House in favor of the BRA in 2001 may
have been swayed by campaign contributions from the consumer
credit industry - about five percent of the House's 74% majority in
favor of passage.42 Indeed, although Nunez and Rosenthal examine
only the number of votes influenced by creditor contributions, it is
probably the case that these votes were at least to some extent
canceled out by lobbying by bankruptcy professionals against reform.
The modest effect of lobbying by creditors and lawyers suggests that
positions on the BRA were driven largely by the ideological debate
between "pro-debtor" and "personal responsibility" advocates rather
than political and financial calculation. In this, the BRA can be distin
guished from the reform process of the 1978 Code. In 1978, the debate
focused primarily on reforms to the chapter 11 process rather than on
consumers. As a result, the debates were technocratic and interest
group driven, allowing bankruptcy professionals to claim an upper
hand in the process. By contrast, the core reforms in the BRA were
driven by consumer-bankruptcy issues, an area with heavy ideological
overtones.
The three sets of influences that comprise the core of Skeel's
analysis thus explain the probable success of the BRA, despite the
efforts to derail it. First, an ideological shift in Congress following the
1994 elections created a new constituency for an ideology rooted in
personal responsibility, which manifested itself in a concern over
soaring personal-bankruptcy filing rates during an era of unprece
dented economic prosperity. This new ideological influence counter
balanced the traditional prodebtor ideology that historically domi42. STEPHEN NUNEZ & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, BANKRUPTCY 'REFORM' CONGRESS:
CREDITORS, COMMIITEES, IDEOLOGY, AND FLOOR VOTING IN THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS (Russell Sage Found., Working Paper No. 196, 2002).
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nated ideological thinking about bankruptcy. Second, the interests of
bankruptcy professionals were attenuated relative to prior eras. In
part, this was because the new Republican majority was less respon
sive than Democrats were to the interests of lawyers. In addition, early
on in the reform process bankruptcy professionals committed them
selves to a crude and partisan rhetorical and political strategy that
sacrificed the· one source of influence that they were able to claim in
the past - the provision of constructive nonideological technical
advice. Third, creditors were able to overcome their traditional collec
tive-action problems and thereby patch together a set of reforms that
would satisfy creditors from across the spectrum: secured, unsecured,
marital support, and even government creditors. Thus a combination
of factors congealed to create an environment rich for bankruptcy
reform: a less debtor-oriented ideological environment, weakened
influence by bankruptcy.professionals, and strengthened influence by
creditors. In this environment, therefore, the overwhelming and
bipartisan support for bankruptcy reform in both houses of Congress
was not surprising. Although reform has failed thus far, it is expected
eventually.
III.

THE FUTURE OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

In the final chapters of the book,, Skeel reviews many of the
current "hot topics" in bankruptcy law and policy and offers predic
tions about the future of bankruptcy law, both domestically and inter
nationally. Of particular interest is the impact of globalization on the
future evolution of American bankruptcy law. Skeel concludes that
globalization will have minimal impact on the structure of American
bankruptcy law. "Although the new, world economy will have impor
tant effects," he writes, "the basic parameters of American bankruptcy
law are unlikely to change. We will continue to see the same three
forces - creditors, prodebtor ideology, and bankruptcy professionals
- and the shape of the bankruptcy process will remain roughly the
same" (p. 241). In particular, Skeel observes, despite the many criti
cisms of American bankruptcy law, under the pressures of globaliza
tion, bankruptcy law in much of the world is evolving to look more
like the American bankruptcy system, rath_er than less (p. 241). On
both business bankruptcy and consumer bankruptcy, the rest of the
world is loosening its bankruptcy laws (p. 241). Thus, even though
other countries' bankruptcy laws generally remain stricter than in the
United States, the direction is clear ---:-- they are moving toward more
generous bankruptcy laws.
The important point, however, is that all of the pressure unleashed by
globalization is pushing in this direction. All around the world, other na
tions are beginning to adopt some of the features of U.S. bankruptcy law.
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There is little evidence of a trend in any other direction, in the United
States or elsewhere. (p. 243)

Although the rest of the world does seem to be moving toward
more generous bankruptcy laws, in the United States there is in fact
clear evidence of a countertrend as exemplified by the BRA. Not only
does the BRA temper the prodebtor character of consumer bank
ruptcy, it also streamlines business bankruptcies to reduce the cost and
delay of the chapter 11 process. By contrast, there is no viable
constituency for the adoption of the NBRC's prodebtor recommenda
tions. In fact, as chapter 11 has increasingly become a refuge for
scandal-plagued companies, public opinion seems to be turning against
chapter 11. In addition, creditors are becoming increasingly ingenious
in changing actual bankruptcy practice and devising nonlegislative
contractual and other "self-help" mechanisms for effectively opting
out of bankruptcy completely or for devising mechanisms to minimize
the expense, risk, and delay of being entangled in America's bank
ruptcy proceedings.43 These legislative and practice attempts to rein in
the excesses of the American bankruptcy system manifest de jure and
de facto trends toward a more restrictive bankruptcy regime in the
United States.
Therefore, globalization probably will not create a uniform trend
toward American-style bankruptcy systems. Rather, the likely result
will be global convergence of bankruptcy regimes. Regimes that are
excessively prodebtor, such as the United States, will tend to become
less so; regimes that are insufficiently prodebtor, such as Europe, will
tend to liberalize. The effect of globalization will be to establish a
process of competition in economic policy that will tend to reward
countries that adopt efficient economic policies and punish those that
do not.44 Within America's federalist system, competition among
states has tended to produce convergence on efficient commercial and
corporate law rules.45 Given the free flow of capital around the world
today, it is likely that such pressures will increasingly shape corporate
governance rules around the world. Excessively prodebtor regimes
such as the United States will be forced to temper their excesses in
order to remain competitive in the global environment while Europe
and elsewhere will tend to liberalize in order to increase entrepreneur
ship and capital development in their moribund economies.

43. See John Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bank
ruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 699 (2002).
44. See John 0. McGinnis, In Praise of the Efficiency of Decentralized Traditions and
Their Preconditions, 77 N.C. L. REV. 523, 529-30 (1999).
45. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniform
ity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 ECON. I NQUIRY 464
(1996).
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Additionally, globalization probably will have the unanticipated
effect of weakening the prodebtpr ideology that has dominated
American bankruptcy law during this century. Progressives defend
chapter 11 as a mechanism for advancing social goals such as preserva
tion of jobs and communities. This argument is questionable on its
face, as inefficient chapter 11 reorganizations save incumbent busi
nesses and jobs, but only at the cost of reducing the availability of
capital for new entrepreneurs and the creation of new jobs elsewhere
in the economy.46 More importantly, the attainment of these progres
sive policies depends on the willingness of private creditors to subsi
dize their attainment. There is strong evidence that creditors increas
ingly are unwilling to bear this burden and, as a result, are already
trying to opt out of the chapter 11 system. Globalization amplifies this
reluctance, producing pressures toward the adoption of efficient eco
nomic policies, whether tax, trade, securities, labor, or bankruptcy
policies. In the past, creditors were forced to bear these costs of social
engineering because of the difficulty of escaping the reach of national
bankruptcy laws. Moreover, to the extent that social benefits were
actually provided, creditors may have been more willing to subsidize
inefficient reorganizations when the beneficiaries were other Ameri
cans.
In the modern world, however, capital is not tied to any particular
country. Thus, it is far easier to escape the "tax" imposed by a nation's
inefficient bankruptcy laws. It also is doubtful that international inves
tors will allow American bankruptcy judges to redistribute their
wealth to subsidize American workers and lawyers through chapter
11. To the extent that chapter 11 raises the costs and risks of investing
in America, international investors will direct their capital to more
efficient markets. In short, the pressures on the United States to adopt
more efficient bankruptcy laws are much greater than in the past. As
chapter 11 hampers American competitiveness, policymakers will find
it increasingly expensive to indulge the ideological desires of bank
ruptcy progressives, thus their influence should wane.
In the consumer-bankruptcy arena, the BRA reflects a similar
trend in the direction of greater restrictions on access to bankruptcy.
American society is gradually reestablishing traditional values in the
wake of what Francis Fukuyama has dubbed "the Great Disruption"
of the past several decades.47 Promiscuous consumer-bankruptcy laws
were just one of the many social experiments of recent decades that
have proven contrary to human nature and the needs of successful
societies.48 The movement toward greater accountability in consumer
46. See Zywicki, Rescuing Business, supra note 18, at 373-74.
47. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE
RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1 999).
48. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, supra note 22, at 430-31.

2036

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:2016

bankruptcy represents a necessary step of social self-correction after a
period of chaos and revolution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

David Skeel has written a brilliant and comprehensive book on the
history of bankruptcy law in America. The use of cutting-edge analyti
cal tools makes it possible for him to persuasively explain the history
of American bankruptcy law, as well as to offer insightful predictions
about the future evolution of bankruptcy law in America. It is
certainly the most important book on bankruptcy law that has been
published since Thomas Jackson's acclaimed The Logic and Limits of
Bankruptcy. Given the prominence of bankruptcy in today's business
and political headlines, this is a book that should gain a wide audience
among bankruptcy specialists and commercial and corporate law
generalists alike.

